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Abstract
A new framework for linguistic reasoning is proposed based on a random set model of the degree of
appropriateness of a label. Labels are assumed to be chosen from a finite predefined set of labels and
the set of appropriate labels for a value is defined as a random set-valued function from a population
of individuals into the set of subsets of labels. Appropriateness degrees are then evaluated relative
to the distribution on this random set where the appropriateness degree of a label corresponds to the
probability that it is contained in the set of appropriate labels. This interpretation is referred to as label
semantics. A natural calculus for appropriateness degrees is described which is weakly functional
while taking into account the logical structure of expressions. Given this framework it is shown that a
bayesian approach can be adopted in order to infer probability distributions on the underlying variable
given constraints both in the form of linguistic expressions and mass assignments. In addition, two
conditional measures are introduced for evaluating the appropriateness of a linguistic expression
given other linguistic information.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The limitations of classical modelling techniques to effectively capture the behaviour
of complex systems has become increasingly clear over recent years. This has motivated
research into new, alternative modelling paradigms by the artificial intelligence community
(e.g., fuzzy reasoning, possibility theory, Bayesian modelling, default reasoning: see [4,8,
11,28,30]). All of these approaches share an emphasis on high level qualitative descriptions
as opposed to a more traditional low level framework. The advantage of such higher-level
knowledge representation is that it allows for the fusion of expert or background knowl-
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edge and knowledge derived from data. Furthermore, it tends to provide a clearer insight
into the underlying nature of the system than can be obtained from less transparent lower-
level models. Another feature shared by many of the new approaches is that they provide
a methodology for reasoning in the presence of uncertainty. This is no coincidence, but
rather is due to the fact that uncertainty and imprecision are often inherent in complex
modelling problems. This uncertainty is not only due to lack of precision or errors in mea-
sured features but is often present in the model itself since the available features may not
be sufficient to provide a complete model of the system. To illustrate this point, consider
the important area of river basin modelling for flood forecasting. For this problem it is
often necessary to model river levels at a particular time point, purely in terms of rainfall
and river levels at earlier times. However, in reality so many complex features influence
runoff that it is both difficult to identify the most important and practically impossible to
measure any but a few of them. For instance, the likelihood that a given rainfall event will
produce a flood is dramatically affected by such factors as the size of the drainage basin,
the topography of the basin, the amount of urban use within the basin and so on.
While the development of analytical models may be impractical for many complex sys-
tems, there is often data available implicitly describing the behaviour of the system. For
example, large companies such as supermarkets, high street stores and banks collect a
stream of data relating to the behaviour of their customers. Such data must be analysed
to provide flexible models of customer behaviour that can be used to aid a wide variety
of decision-making processes. Hence, if a higher level modelling approach is to be truly
effective it must provide a natural knowledge representation framework for inductive learn-
ing. As such it is important that it allows for the modelling of uncertainty, imprecision and
vagueness in a semantically clear manner. Indeed, we should emphasise the necessity of a
clear underlying semantics for any higher-level modelling paradigm since one of the fun-
damental reasons for a high level approach is to provide transparent models that can be
understood and used by practitioners in the relevant fields. This cannot be achieved if the
validity of the underlying concepts and inference processes are either obscured or in doubt.
In the sequel we will outline a new methodology for linguistic modelling and show how it
can be applied in an inductive learning context. The approach will centre on the modelling
of linguistic constraints on variables as proposed by Zadeh [37] although the underlying
semantics will be quite different.
The phrase computing with words was introduced by Zadeh [42] to capture the idea of
computation based not on numerical values, but on natural language terms and expressions.
As a general idea this is clearly of relevance to the type of modelling described above,
however, we shall propose a quite different interpretation to that given in [38–40]. The
general methodology for computing with words proposed by Zadeh is that of fuzzy set
theory or fuzzy logic and in particular is based on the idea of linguistic variables (see [38–
40]). A linguistic variable is defined as a variable that takes natural language terms such as
large, small, tall, medium etc. as values and where the meaning of these words is given by
fuzzy sets on some underlying domain of discourse. Hence, a particular expression of the
form Bill is tall can be taken as expressing the fact that the linguistic variable describing
Bill’s height has the value tall, and such a statement has a partial truth-value corresponding
to the membership degree of Bill’s actual height in the fuzzy set representing the meaning
of tall. The truth-value of compound expressions such as Bill is tall or medium is then
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evaluated according to a fuzzy set calculus based on some choice of t-norm or t-conorm
(see [18] for an exposition).
In our view the principal problem with the above approach is that the semantics
underlying standard fuzzy logic or indeed the notion of membership function itself is rather
obscure. The difficulty is revealed by consideration of a fundamental question that should
be asked of all models of linguistic constraints. What information is conveyed regarding
the underlying variable? For instance, if someone asserts that Bill is tall exactly what
information about Bill’s height is conveyed by that assertion? In the case of fuzzy set
theory, according to Zadeh [41], the latter provides a flexible constraint on the variable
representing Bill’s height. More specifically, it tells us that the possibility distribution on
Bill’s height corresponds to the membership function of the fuzzy set tall. However, this
association with possibility distributions does not, in itself, support the assumption of a
fully truth-functional calculus for membership degrees, as in fuzzy set theory (see [26]).
Indeed, it does not really provide any insight into the behaviour of compound fuzzy sets.
One possible solution to this difficulty is to accept that neither possibility distributions or
fuzzy memberships are sufficiently intuitive to be treated as primitive notions and attempt
to provide a lower-level model. If we are going to adopt the fuzzy logic methodology then
any such semantics should not only be intuitive but should also be consistent with a fully
truth-functional calculus based on a particular choice of t-norm and t-conorm. A number
of different models have been investigated and these are reviewed in [6,27].
One of the most promising ideas is to view fuzzy memberships as being fixed point
coverage functions of random sets, themselves representing uncertainty or variation in the
underlying crisp definition of a concept [12]. For instance, we might have a population
of different individuals each proposing their own set of heights that would qualify for the
description tall. The associated random set would be a function from the set of individ-
uals into the set of subsets of heights and the membership of a particular height, h, in
the fuzzy set tall would correspond to the probability of encountering an individual who
included h in their crisp set definition. This is the essence of the voting model for fuzzy
sets proposed originally by Black [3] and later by Gaines [10]. Clearly this interpretation
is implicitly probabilistic in its nature and hence, it is not perhaps surprising that it does
not fit well within the inference framework of fuzzy logic. One problem is that there is
not a one-to-one correspondence between fuzzy sets and random sets. The same fuzzy set
could be generated by a potentially infinite family of random sets (see Goodman [12]). In
possibility theory this problem is overcome by making the assumption that the random set
is consonant (i.e., the set of sets with non-zero mass constitutes a nested hierarchy). Lawry
[20] justifies this by introducing the idea of an optimism parameter according to which the
more optimistic a voter the more likely they are to include h in the extension of the concept
tall. It is difficult to consolidate such an assumption with a fully truth-functional calculus
since, in that case, a voter with a high optimism parameter would be required to be opti-
mistic regarding both the concept and its negation. Lawry [20] suggests a weaker notion
of negation to overcome this difficulty but nonetheless the treatment of negation remains
problematic. In the sequel we outline a new random set based approach but where the ran-
dom sets relate to sets of appropriate labels for a value. We describe a formal framework
for such an approach and show how it overcomes some of the problems highlighted above.
This new calculus, however, will not be fully truth-functional but rather functional in a
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weaker, although sufficient, sense. The work described in Sections 2 and 3 is an extension
of that presented in an earlier paper [22]. This work is clearly related to random set se-
mantics for fuzzy sets as proposed by Goodman [12] and Nguyen [25]. However, the latter
defines random sets on the underlying attribute universe whereas our proposed framework
will define random sets over labels. In our view the focus on the labels themselves provides
an interesting new perspective.
2. Label semantics
The fundamental notion underlying label semantics is that when individuals make
assertions of the kind described above they are essentially providing information about
what labels are appropriate for the value of some underlying variable. For simplicity, we
assume that for a given context only a finite set of words is available. This is a somewhat
controversial assumption since it might be claimed that by recursively applying hedges we
can easily generate an infinite set of labels from an initially finite set of words. In other
words, if tall is a possible label for Bill’s height then so is very tall, quite tall, very very
tall and so on. This claim is problematic, however, for a number of reasons. For instance,
it would appear that the use of hedges in natural language is somewhat restricted. One
might use the expressions very tall and quite tall but very quite tall or even quite very
tall are never used. Also, there seems in practice to be a limit on the number of times
hedges can be applied to a label before it becomes nonsensical. This latter point seems
to suggest that in practice only a finite number of labels may be available even in natural
language. Another related difficulty with the use of hedges is determining the relationship
between the meaning of a word and the meaning of any new word generated from it by
application of some hedge. In Zadeh [38–40] it is suggested that such relationships have a
simple functional form. For example, if the meaning of tall is defined by a fuzzy set with
membership function µtall then Zadeh proposes that the meaning of very tall is the fuzzy
set with membership µ2tall. The choice of this particular function seems relatively arbitrary
and indeed, perhaps more fundamentally, it is far from apparent that there should be any
such simple functional relationship between the meaning of a word and that of a new word
generated by application of a hedge. In other words, we would claim that while hedges
are a simple syntactic device for generating new labels there is no equally simple semantic
device for generating the associated new meanings.
Now let us return to the problem of interpreting natural language statements regarding,
say, Bill’s height as represented by variable H . Let us suppose then that there is a fixed
finite set of possible labels for H , denoted LA, and that these labels are both known and
completely identical for any individual who will make or interpret a statement regarding
Bill’s height. Given these assumptions how can we now interpret a statement such as Bill
is tall as asserted by a particular individual I? We claim that one natural interpretation is
that it merely conveys the information that, according to I , tall is an appropriate label for
the value of H . In order to clarify this idea suppose I knows that H = h and that given this
information he/she is able to identify a subset of LA consisting of those words appropriate
as labels for the value h. This set is denotedDIh which stands for the description of h given
by I . If we allow I to vary across some population of individuals V then we naturally
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obtain a random set Dh from V into the power set of LA such that Dh(I) = DI . Givenh
this we can obtain higher level information about the degree of applicability of a label to
a value by defining, in this case, µtall(h) = Pr({I ∈ V | tall ∈DIh}) where the latter prob-
ability is calculated on the basis of some underlying prior distribution on V . Now clearly
this is a function from Ω into [0,1] and therefore can technically be viewed as a fuzzy set.
However, we shall use the term ‘appropriateness degree’ partly because it more accurately
reflects the underlying semantics and partly to highlight the quite distinct calculus for these
functions that will be introduced in the sequel. Similarly we can determine a probability
distribution (or mass assignment) for the random set Dh by defining ∀S ⊆ LA mh(S) =
Pr({I ∈ V |DIh = S}). Now suppose that I does not know the value of H (or alternatively
we do not know the value assigned to H by I ) then they (we) would naturally define a
random set DIH from the universe of H into the power set of LA such that DIH (h) = DIh.
The distribution of this random set will clearly depend on the prior information available
regarding the distribution of H . Hence, the assertion by I that Bill is tall would in this con-
text be interpreted as tall ∈DIH . Finally in the case when we have no information regarding
I then we can define a random set DH from the cross product of V and the universe of
H into the power set of LA such that DH (I,h)=DIh and interpret the above statement as
tall ∈ DH . In order to clarify some of these ideas consider the following example where
the objective is to provide linguistic labels for the outcome of a single throw of a dice.
Example 1. Suppose the variable SCORE with universe {1,2,3,4,5,6} gives the outcome
of a single throw of a particular dice. Let LA = {low,medium,high} and V = {I1, I2, I3}
then a possible definition of DSCORE is as follows:
DI11 =DI21 =DI31 = {low}, DI12 = {low,medium}, DI22 = {low}, DI32 = {low},
DI13 = {medium}, DI23 = {medium}, DI33 = {medium, low},
DI14 = {medium,high}, DI24 = {medium}, DI24 = {medium},
DI15 = {high}, DI25 = {medium,high}, DI35 = {high},
DI16 =DI26 =DI36 = {high}.
The value of the appropriateness measure will depend on the underlying distribution on
V = {I1, I2, I3}, perhaps representing the weight of importance associated with the views
of each individual. For instance, if we assume a uniform distribution on V then the degree
of appropriateness of low as a label for 3 is given by
|{I ∈ V | low ∈DI3}|
|V | =
|{I3}|
|V | =
1
3
.
Overall the appropriateness degrees for each word are given by
µlow(1)= µlow(2)= 1, µlow(3)= 13 ,
µmedium(2)= 13 , µmedium(3)= 1, µmedium(4)= 1, µmedium(5)=
1
3
,
µhigh(4)= 13 , µhigh(5)= 1, µhigh(6)= 1.
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Similarly, assuming a uniform prior on V we can determine mass assignments on DSCORE
for SCORE = 1, . . . ,6. For example, if SCORE = 2 we have
m2
({low,medium})= |{I ∈ V |DI2 = {low,medium}}||V | = |{I1}||V | = 13 .
The mass assignments for each value of x are given by
m1 = {low} : 1, m2 = {low,medium} : 13 , {low} :
2
3
,
m3 = {medium} : 23 , {low,medium} :
1
3
,
m4 = {medium,high} : 13 , {medium} :
2
3
,
m5 = {high} : 23 , {medium,high} :
1
3
, m6 = {high} : 1.
In order, to determine an overall mass assignmentm as SCORE varies, we need to know the
distribution on the universe {1, . . . ,6}. Assuming a uniform distribution gives, for example,
m
({low,medium})= 6∑
x=1
mx
({low,medium})Pr(x)= 13 + 13
6
= 1
9
.
Overall we have:
m= {low} : 5
18
, {low,medium} : 1
9
,
{medium} : 2
9
, {medium,high} : 1
9
, {high} : 5
18
.
We now consider the problem of how to interpret expressions involving compound
labels built up using some set of logical connectives. For the scope of this paper we will
consider the four main connectives ∧, ∨, → and ¬. Firstly, let us consider the case of
negation. How do we interpret expressions of the form Bill is not tall? We take the view
here that negation is used to express the non-suitability of a label. In other words the above
statement means that tall is not an appropriate label for H , or tall /∈DH . Conjunction and
disjunction are then taken as having the obvious meanings so that Bill is tall and medium
is interpreted as saying that both tall and medium are appropriate as labels for H (i.e.,
{tall,medium} ⊆ DH ), and Bill is tall or medium is interpreted as saying that either tall
is an appropriate label for H or medium is an appropriate label for H (i.e., tall ∈ DH
or medium ∈ DH ). In the case of implication we take very tall implies tall to mean that
whenever very tall is an appropriate label for H so is tall (i.e., very tall ∈DH implies that
tall ∈DH ).
It will clearly be desirable to measure the appropriateness degree of such compound
expressions for particular values of the underlying variable. For instance, given the
scenario outlined in Example 1 we might want to know what is the appropriateness
degree of the expression medium or low to the value 3. Now this expression identifies
the set of subsets of LA which either contains low or medium (i.e., {{low}, {medium},
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{low,medium}, {low,high}, {medium,high}, {low,medium,high}}). Hence, it is natural to
define the appropriateness degree of medium or low to 3 as the sum of the values of m3
across this set (i.e., m3({low})+m3({medium})+m3({low,medium})+m3({low,high})+
m3({medium,high})+m3({low,medium,high}) = 23 + 13 = 1). In the following section we
formalise the above ideas within a logical framework.
3. A formal framework for label semantics
In this paper we adopt a logical formalisation for label semantics where label expres-
sions are represented by propositional logic sentences. Consider a formal language consist-
ing of the set of the labels LA= {L1, . . . ,Ln} and the connectives ∧, ∨, → and ¬. Within
this language we can represent compound linguistic descriptions generated recursively by
application of the connectives:
Definition 2 (Label expressions). The set of label expressions, LE, is defined recursively
as follows:
(i) Li ∈ LE for i = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) If θ,ϕ ∈ LE then ¬θ , θ ∧ ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ, θ → ϕ ∈ LE.
Recall from the discussion in the previous section that a label expression identifies a set
of subsets of LA which capture its meaning. We now give a formal definition of this subset
for any general label expression:
Definition 3 (Appropriate label sets). Every θ ∈ LE is associated with a set of subsets of
LA (i.e., an element of 22LA ), denoted λ(θ) and defined recursively as follows:
(i) λ(Li)= {S ⊆ LA | Li ∈ S}.
(ii) λ(θ ∧ ϕ)= λ(θ)∩ λ(ϕ).
(iii) λ(θ ∨ ϕ)= λ(θ)∪ λ(ϕ).
(iv) λ(θ → ϕ)= λ(θ)∪ λ(ϕ).
(v) λ(¬θ)= λ(θ).
Intuitively λ(θ) corresponds to those subsets of LA identified as being candidates for the
set of appropriate labels for x (i.e., possible values forDx ) by expression θ . In this sense the
imprecise linguistic restriction ‘x is θ ’ on x corresponds to the strict constraint Dx ∈ λ(θ)
on Dx . Hence, the linguistic description Dx can provide an alternative to linguistic
variables (Zadeh [38–40]) as a means of formally representing linguistic constraints.
Example 4. Let LA= {small,medium, large} then
λ(small∧medium)= {{small,medium}, {small,medium, large}},
λ(small∨medium)= {{small}, {medium}, {small,medium}, {small, large},
{medium, large}, {small,medium, large}},
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λ(small →medium)= {{small,medium}, {small,medium, large}, {medium, large},
{medium}, {large}, ∅},
λ(¬small)= {{medium}, {large}, {medium, large}, ∅}.
The following results illustrate the clear relationship between appropriate label sets
and the logical structure of the expressions that identify them. Initially, however, we
introduce some basic notation. Let Val denote the set of valuations (i.e., allocations of
truth values) on {L1, . . . ,Ln}. For v ∈ Val v(Li) = true can be taken as meaning that
Li is an appropriate label in the current context. Let LE0 = {L1, . . . ,Ln} and LEn+1 =
LEn∪{¬θ, θ ∧ϕ, θ ∨ϕ, θ → ϕ | θ,ϕ ∈ LEn}. Clearly we have that LE =⋃n LEn and also,
from a valuation v on LE0 the truth-value, v(θ), for θ ∈ LE can be determined recursively
in the usual way by application of the truth tables for the connectives.
Definition 5. Let τ : Val→ 2LA such that ∀v ∈ Val τ (v)= {Li | v(Li)= true}.
Notice that τ is clearly a bijection. Also note that for v ∈ Val τ (v) can be associated
with a Herbrand interpretation of the language LE (see [24]).
Lemma 6. ∀θ ∈ LE {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(θ)= true} = λ(θ).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the complexity of θ .
Suppose θ ∈ LE0, so that θ = Li for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Now as v ranges across all
valuations for which Li is true, then τ (v) ranges across all subsets of LA that contain Li .
Hence, {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(Li)= true} = {S ⊆ LA | {Li} ⊆ S} = λ(Li) as required.
Now suppose we have ∀θ ∈ LEn, {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(θ)= true} = λ(θ) and consider an
expression θ ∈ LEn+1 then either θ ∈ LEn in which case the result follows trivially or one
of the following hold:
(i) θ = φ ∧ ϕ where φ,ϕ ∈ LEn. In this case{
v ∈ Val | v(φ ∧ ϕ)= true}
= {v ∈ Val | v(φ)= true}∩ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true}.
Therefore,{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(φ ∧ ϕ)= true}
= {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(φ)= true} ∩ {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(ϕ)= true}
= λ(φ)∩ λ(ϕ) (by the inductive hypothesis)
= λ(φ ∧ ϕ) by Definition 3.
(ii) θ = φ ∨ ϕ where φ,ϕ ∈ LEn. In this case{
v ∈ Val | v(φ ∨ ϕ)= true}= {v ∈ Val | v(φ)= true}∪ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true}.
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Therefore,{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(φ ∨ ϕ)= true}
= {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(φ)= true} ∪ {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(ϕ)= true}
= λ(φ)∪ λ(ϕ) (by the inductive hypothesis)
= λ(φ ∨ ϕ) by Definition 3.
(iii) θ = φ→ ϕ where φ,ϕ ∈ LEn. In this case{
v ∈ Val | v(φ→ ϕ)= true}
= {v ∈ Val | v(φ)= false}∪ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true}
= {v ∈ Val | v(φ)= true}∪ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true}.
Therefore,{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(φ→ ϕ)= true}
= {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(φ)= true} ∪ {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(ϕ)= true}
= λ(φ)∪ λ(ϕ) (by the inductive hypothesis)
= λ(φ→ ϕ) by Definition 3.
(iv) θ =¬φ where φ ∈ LEn. In this case{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(¬φ)= true}
= {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(φ)= true}
= λ(φ) (by the inductive hypothesis)
= λ(¬φ) by Definition 3. ✷
Proposition 7. For θ,ϕ ∈ LE θ |= ϕ iff λ(θ)⊆ λ(ϕ).
Proof. (⇒)
θ |= ϕ⇒ {v ∈ Val | v(θ)= true}⊆ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true}
⇒ {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(θ)= true}⊆ {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(ϕ)= true}
⇒ λ(θ)⊆ λ(ϕ) by Lemma 6.
(⇐) Suppose λ(θ) ⊆ λ(ϕ). Then λ(θ) = {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(θ) = true} and λ(ϕ) =
{τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(ϕ)= true} by Lemma 6.
Therefore{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(θ)= true}⊆ {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(ϕ)= true}
⇒ {v ∈ Val | v(θ)= true}⊆ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true}
since τ is a bijection. ✷
A trivial corollary of this proposition is:
Corollary 8. For θ,ϕ ∈ LE θ ≡ ϕ iff λ(θ)= λ(ϕ).
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Proposition 9. If ϕ ∈ LE is inconsistent then λ(ϕ)= ∅.Proof. If ϕ ∈ LE is inconsistent then ϕ ≡ θ ∧ ¬θ so that by Corollary 8. λ(ϕ) = λ(θ ∧
¬θ)= λ(θ)∩ λ(¬θ)= λ(θ) ∩ λ(θ)= ∅ by Definition 3. ✷
In order to introduce higher level measures of appropriateness as discussed in earlier
sections we need to consider the logical structure of label expressions in conjunction with
a set of individuals, a probability distribution on that set and a probability distribution on
the domain Ω . To allow for this we now introduce the notions of a frame and an extended
frame.
Definition 10 (Frame and extended frame).
(i) A frame is a tuple 〈V,PV 〉 where V is a set of individuals and PV is a probability
distribution on V .
(ii) An extended frame is a tuple 〈V,PV ,Ω,PΩ〉 where 〈V,PV 〉 is a frame and PΩ is a
distribution on the underlying domain Ω .
Definition 11 (Mass assignments and label appropriateness degrees).
(i) Given a frame Γ = 〈V,PV 〉 we define the mass assignment of Dx by
∀S ⊆ LA mΓx (S)= PV
({
I ∈ V |DIx = S
})
.
In the case where V is finite and PV is the uniform distribution this corresponds to
∀S ⊆ LA mΓx (S)=
|{I ∈ V |DIx = S}|
|V | .
From this mass assignment we define the appropriateness measure (or degree) µΓ by
∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈Ω µΓθ (x)=
∑
S∈λ(θ)
mΓx (S).
(ii) Given an extended frame Γ + = 〈V,PV ,Ω,PΩ〉 then the mass assignment of Dx as x
varies across Ω is given by
∀S ⊆ LA mΓ +(S)= PV × PΩ
({〈I, x〉 |DIx = S}).
From this mass assignment we define the general appropriateness degree by
∀θ ∈ LE µΓ +θ =
∑
S∈λ(θ)
mΓ
+
(S).
In cases where the frame or extended frame is fixed we shall drop the superscripts Γ
and Γ + in the above definitions.
Notice that it is not a requirement of Definition 11 that zero mass be allocated
to the empty set. In label semantics mΓx (∅) corresponds to the probability in frame
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Γ that no labels are appropriate to describe x (i.e., that Dx = ∅). In terms of
appropriateness degrees, allocating a non-zero value to mΓx (∅) has the consequence that
max(µΓL1(x), . . . ,µ
Γ
Ln
(x)) < 1.
Trivially, by Proposition 7 we have that if θ |= ϕ then for any frame Γ ∀x ∈ Ω
µΓθ (x)  µΓϕ (x) and for any extended frame Γ + µΓ
+
θ  µΓ
+
ϕ . Similarly by Corollary 8
we have that if θ ≡ ϕ then for any frame Γ , ∀x ∈Ω µΓθ (x)= µΓϕ (x) and for any extended
frame Γ + µΓ +θ = µΓ
+
ϕ .
Proposition 12. For any frame Γ , ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈Ω µΓ¬θ (x)= 1−µΓθ (x).
Proof.
µΓ¬θ (x)=
∑
S∈λ(¬θ)
mΓx (S)=
∑
S∈λ(θ)
mΓx (S)= 1−
∑
S∈λ(θ)
mΓx (S)= 1−µΓθ (x). ✷
In order to investigate the behaviour of the appropriateness measure on conjunctions,
disjunctions and implications we need to introduce the notion of consonant mass
assignments. More specifically, we will only consider frames Γ such that mΓx is consonant
for all x ∈ Ω . Here, consonance has the standard random set meaning (see [13]) that
∀S,S′ ⊆ LA if both mΓx (S) > 0 and mΓx (S′) > 0 then either S ⊆ S′ for S′ ⊆ S.
Consonance of label sets implies that individuals in V differ regarding what labels are
appropriate for a value only in terms of generality or specificity. This could be justified
by the idea that all individuals share a common ordering on the appropriateness of labels
for a value and that the composition of DIx is consistent with this ordering for each I .
More formally, supposing for each element x ∈Ω the population V shares a common total
ordering x where for Li,Lj ∈ LA, Li x Lj means that Lj is as least as appropriate as
a label for x as Li . In this case, when deciding on a set of appropriate labels, an individual
I would be expected to be consistent with x so that if Li ∈ DIx then Lj will also be in
DIx for all labels Lj such that Li x Lj . Clearly, in this case as we vary individuals across
V then the values of DIx occurring will form a nested hierarchy. For instance, in the case
of the dice problem described in Example 1 possible appropriateness orderings for values
SCORE = 1, . . . ,6 are as follows:
high1 medium1 low, high2 medium2 low,
high3 low3 medium, low4 high4 medium,
low5 medium5 high, low6 medium6 high.
Hence, for any individual I , if I decides that low is an appropriate label for 3 (low ∈DI3 )
then to be consistent with the ordering 3 they must also decide that medium is an
appropriate label for 3 (medium ∈ DI3 ) since medium is at least as appropriate as low as
a label for 3.
Notice, that the consonance assumption for random sets on labels is in one sense weaker
than the corresponding assumption for random sets on the universe Ω , since the latter
requires individuals to maintain the same level of specificity across all values in Ω . To see
this more clearly recall Example 1 and observe that mx is consonant ∀x ∈ {1, . . . ,6}. Now
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for each member I ∈ V the extension (associated subset of Ω) of, say medium is given by
{x ∈ Ω | medium ∈ DIx}. Hence, we obtain {2,3,4}, {3,4,5} and {3,4} for I1, I2 and I3
respectively. Clearly, however, this does not form a nested hierarchy.
Proposition 13. If ∀x ∈Ω mΓx is a consonant mass assignment then for Li,Lj ∈ LA we
have that ∀x ∈Ω µΓLi∧Lj (x)=min(µΓLi (x),µΓLj (x)).
Proof. Notice
λ(Li ∧Lj)= λ(Li) ∩ λ(Lj )=
{
S ⊆ LA | {Li} ⊆ S
} ∩ {S ⊆ LA | {Lj } ⊆ S}
= {S ⊆ LA | {Li,Lj } ⊆ S}.
Hence,
∀x ∈Ω µΓLi∧Lj (x)=
∑
S: {Li,Lj }⊆S
mΓx (S).
For any x , since mΓx is a consonant mass assignment then it must have the form
mΓx =M0 :m0, . . . ,Mk :mk where Mt ⊂Mt+1 for t = 0, . . . , k− 1. Now suppose w.l.o.g.
that µΓLi (x) µ
Γ
Lj
(x) then {Li} ⊆Mt iff {Li,Lj } ⊆Mt for t = 0, . . . , k. Therefore
µΓLi∧Lj (x)=
∑
S: {Li}⊆S
mΓx (S)= µΓLi (x)=min
(
µΓLi (x),µ
Γ
Lj
(x)
)
. ✷
Proposition 14. If for all x ∈Ω mΓx is a consonant mass assignment then for Li,Lj ∈ LA
we have that ∀x ∈Ω µΓLi∨Lj (x)=max(µΓLi (x),µΓLj (x)).
In order to compare and contrast label semantics with the many-valued logic approach
to fuzzy reasoning we first give a formal definition of what is meant for a calculus to be
strongly functional.
Definition 15. Let w : LE × Ω → [0,1] then w is said to be strongly functional iff
there exist functions f¬ : [0,1] → [0,1], f∧ : [0,1]2 → [0,1], f∨ : [0,1]2 → [0,1] and
f→ : [0,1]2 → [0,1] such that ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ Ω w¬θ (x) = f¬(wθ (x)), wθ∧ϕ(x) =
f∧(wθ (x),wϕ(x)), wθ∨ϕ(x) = f∨(wθ (x),wϕ(x)) and wθ→ϕ(x) = f→(wθ (x),wϕ(x))
where wθ(x) is shorthand for w(θ, x).
This should be contrasted with the condition of a calculus being weakly functional as
defined below.
Definition 16. w : LE×Ω →[0,1] is said to be weakly functional iff ∀θ ∈ LE there exists
a function fθ : [0,1]n→[0,1] such that wθ(x)= fθ (wL1(x), . . . ,wLn(x)).
Clearly weak functionality is a strictly weaker condition than strong functionality.
Strong functionality implies that the value of w for, say, a conjunction of expressions
depends only on the value of w for the conjuncts and not on their logic structure. Weak
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functionality allows for that logical structure to be taken into account. It should be noted
that weak functionality is sufficient to insure that all values for w can be determined from
its values on LA and hence the amount of information needed to be stored is still of order
n and not of order exponential in n or higher as is the case in many non-functional calculi
(see [26]). In view of this we would argue that weak functionality is adequate to ensure
computational feasibility for most real world applications.
In the literature, and especially in approximate reasoning it is often the case that the only
type of functionality considered is strong functionality. However, clearly calculi exist that
are weakly but not strongly functional; a typical example being a standard probabilistic
calculus for which the basic events are assumed to be independent. This failure to
distinguish clearly between these two levels of functionality can lead to misunderstandings.
For example, consider the triviality results proved by Dubois and Prade [4] and later
Elkan [9] which show that no non-binary functional calculus can satisfy all the laws of
Boolean algebra. For example, only binary functional calculi can satisfy idempotence as
well as the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction (see [5]). It is important to
realise that in this case the type of functionality referred to is strong functionality. Weakly
functional calculi are not restricted in this manner; for instance probabilistic calculi under
an independence assumption satisfy all the standard boolean laws while maintaining weak
functionality.
To see that the appropriateness measure is not strongly functional notice that despite
Propositions 13 and 14 it does not hold that ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE, µΓθ∧ϕ(x)= min(µΓθ (x),µΓϕ (x))
or that µΓθ∨ϕ(x)= max(µΓθ (x),µΓϕ (x)). For instance, consider µΓLi∧¬Lj (x). From Defini-
tion 3 we have that λ(Li ∧¬Lj)= λ(Li)∩ λ(Lj ) and hence
µΓLi∧¬Lj (x)=
∑
S: Li∈S, Lj /∈S
mΓx (S).
Given the consonance assumption we know that mΓx =M0 :m0, . . . ,Mk :mk where Mt ⊂
Mt+1 for t = 0, . . . , k − 1. Now suppose that µΓLi (x) µΓLj (x) then for all t = 0, . . . , k if
Li ∈Mt then Lj ∈Mt and hence µΓLi∧¬Lj (x)= 0. Alternatively if µΓLi (x) µΓLj (x) then
µΓLi∧¬Lj (x)=
∑
S: Li∈S, Lj /∈S
mΓx (S)=
∑
S: Li∈S
mΓx (S)−
∑
S: Lj∈S
mΓx (S)
= µΓLi (x)−µΓLj (x).
This can be summarised by the expression µΓLi∧¬Lj (x)=max(0,µΓLi (x)−µΓLj (x)) which
is not in general the same as min(µΓLi (x),1− µΓLj (x)) as would be given by the strongly
functional calculus consistent with Propositions 12–14 for which f∧(a, b) = min(a, b),
f∨(a, b) = max(a, b) and f¬(a) = 1 − a. As an aside, we note that this result gives
some insight into the behaviour of implication in label semantics, at least at the level
of individual labels. For instance, we have that Li → Lj is logically equivalent to
¬(Li ∧¬Lj ) and hence µΓLi→Lj (x)= 1−µΓLi∧¬Lj (x)= 1−max(0,µΓLi (x)−µΓLj (x))=
min(1,1 − µΓLi (x)+ µΓLj (x)). This corresponds to Lukasiewicz implication (see [14] or
[18]) although it only applies here at the label level and not for more complex expressions.
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{µ (x), . . . ,µ (x)} ⇒ [mx ] ⇒ µ (x)= f (µ (x) . . .µ (x))=∑ mx(S)L1 Ln θ θ L1 Ln S∈λ(θ)
Fig. 1. Weak functionality of label semantics.
To see that appropriateness degrees are weakly functional recall from elementary
random set theory that a consonant mass assignment [13] is uniquely defined by its fixed
point coverage. This means that mΓx can be completely determined from the values of
µΓL1
(x), . . . ,µΓLn(x) as follows: Let {y1, . . . , yk} = {µΓL (x) | L ∈ LA, µΓL (x) > 0} ordered
such that yt > yt+1 for t = 1, . . . , k − 1 then
mΓx =Mt : yt − yt+1, t = 1, . . .k − 1, Mk : yk, M0 : 1− y1,
where M0 = ∅ and Mt = {L ∈ LA | µΓL (x)  yt } for t = 1, . . . , k. Hence, since from
Definition 11 µΓθ (x) is uniquely determined by λ(θ) and mΓx then there is clearly a
functional relationship between µΓθ (x) and µΓL1(x), . . . ,µ
Γ
Ln
(x) (see Fig. 1). In other
words, for every linguistic expression θ there is a function fθ : [0,1]n → [0,1] such that
µθ(x)= fθ (µL1(x) . . .µLn(x)) where fθ is evaluated by using the consonance assumption
to infer a mass assignment on label sets and then summing the masses of sets contained
in λ(θ). It should also be noted that the appropriateness degree satisfies the laws of the
excluded middle and non-contradiction in the sense that for any frame Γ , ∀x ∈Ω , ∀θ ∈ LE
µΓθ∨¬θ (x) = 1 and µΓθ∧¬θ (x) = 0 as follows immediately from Propositions 9 and 12.
Thus the consonance assumption applied to label sets results in a functional calculus that
coincides with the standard fuzzy logic connectives at the basic label level while preserving
the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction. This should be contrasted with the
consonance assumption applied to random sets on the attribute universe which is not, in
itself, sufficient to generate a functional calculus across a number of fuzzy concepts.
The weak functionality of label semantics brings considerable practical advantages
since we no longer need to have any knowledge of the underlying population of individuals
V or their distribution PV (i.e., the frame) in order to determine mx . Rather, for reasoning
with label semantics in practice we need only define appropriateness degrees µL for
L ∈ LA corresponding to the imprecise definition of each label.
One possible method for calculating µΓθ (x) for a general θ ∈ LE and x ∈ Ω is as
follows: By the disjunctive normal form theorem we have that θ is logically equivalent
to a disjunction of atoms ∨α: α→θ α where each atom is a conjunction of literals of the
form α =∧i±Li . Now it can easily been seen, from Lemma 6, that for any atom of this
form λ(α) is a singleton consisting of the subset of LA made up from those labels appearing
positively in α. Also by Definition 3 and Corollary 8 we have that λ(θ) =⋃α: α→θ λ(α)
and hence µΓθ (x) =
∑
α: α→θ mΓx (λ(α)). (NB. We are abusing notation slightly here and
taking λ(α) to correspond to the single element of 2LA associated with α rather than the set
containing that element.) Alternatively, it may be more convenient just to determine λ(θ)
recursively according to Definition 3.
In the specific context of a particular frame we may be able to make inferences regarding
label expressions that do not generally hold. Furthermore, since a frame effectively defines
the meaning and relationship between the members of LA, it identifies a subset of 2LA
as the sets of appropriate labels that can actually occur. This restriction will make the
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calculation of appropriateness degrees much less complex provided the basic labels do not
overlap semantically too much. For instance, given LA = {small,medium, large} we may
find that in some frame Γ small only overlaps with medium, medium overlaps with small
and large and large only overlaps with medium. This means that only the following occur
as sets of possible labels: ∅, {small}, {small,medium}, {medium}, {medium, large}, {large}.
We can formalise this observation by defining the set of focal elements for a frame as
follows:
Definition 17 (Set of focal elements). The set of focal elements for frame Γ is FΓ = {S ⊆
LA | ∃x ∈Ω, mΓx (S) > 0}.
In other words, the focal sets correspond to the sets of appropriate labels that are
consistent with the definition of the labels in frame Γ . Given this concept we can define
the following natural semantic relations on LE.
Definition 18.
(i) (Follows from in frame Γ ) For θ,ϕ ∈ LE ϕ follows from θ in frame Γ (denoted
θ |=Γ ϕ) iff λ(θ)∩FΓ ⊆ λ(ϕ)∩FΓ .
(ii) (Equivalent to in frame Γ ) For θ,ϕ ∈ LE ϕ is equivalent to θ in frame Γ (denoted
ϕ ≡Γ θ) iff λ(θ) ∩FΓ = λ(ϕ) ∩FΓ .
(iii) For θ ∈ LE θ is universally true in frame Γ (denoted |=Γ θ ) iff λ(θ)∩FΓ =FΓ .
The frame Γ provides an interpretation for each label in LA, as made apparent by
their respective appropriateness degrees, and this should be taken into account in any
subsequent reasoning. So, for instance, while it may not generally be the case that no value
can be both small ∧ large, it certainly is true in any frame for which the appropriateness
degrees of small and large do not overlap. The operators |=Γ and ≡Γ incorporate this
additional information on the meaning of labels into the logical notions of ‘follows from’
and ‘equivalent to’. These operators can also be defined in terms of standard propositional
logic deduction as the following result shows.
Definition 19.
∀S ⊆ LA αS =
( ∧
Li∈S
Li
)
∧
( ∧
Li /∈S
¬Li
)
.
Lemma 20. λ(
∨
S∈FΓ αS)=FΓ .
Proof. λ(
∨
S∈FΓ αS)=
⋃
S∈FΓ λ(αS) by Definition 3. Now
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λ(α )= λ
(( ∧
L
)
∧
( ∧
¬L
))S
Li∈S
i
Li /∈S
i
=
⋂
Li∈S
λ(Li)∩
⋂
Li /∈S
λ(¬Li) by Definition 19
=
⋂
Li∈S
{
T ⊆ LA | Li ∈ T
} ∩ ⋂
Li /∈S
{
T ⊆ LA | Li /∈ T
}
by Definition 3
= {T ⊆ LA | S ⊆ T }∩ {T ⊆ LA | S ∩ T = ∅}= {S}.
Therefore, λ(
∨
S∈FΓ αS)=
⋃
S∈FΓ {S} =FΓ as required. ✷
Proposition 21. θ |=Γ ϕ iff (∨S∈FΓ αS)∧ θ |= ϕ.
Proof. (⇒)
θ |=Γ ϕ⇒ λ(θ) ∩FΓ ⊆ λ(ϕ) ∩FΓ by Definition 18
⇒ λ(θ) ∩ λ
( ∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
⊆ λ(ϕ)∩ λ
( ∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
⊆ λ(ϕ) by Lemma 20
⇒ λ
(
θ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
⊆ λ(ϕ) by Definition 3
⇒
{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v
(
θ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
= true
}
⇒⊆ {τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v(ϕ)= true} by Lemma 6
⇒
{
v ∈ Val | v
(
θ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
= true
}
⇒⊆ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true} since τ is a bijection
⇒ θ,
∨
S∈FΓ
αS |= ϕ as required.
(⇐)
θ,
∨
S∈FΓ
αS |= ϕ
{
v ∈ Val | v
(
θ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
= true
}
⊆ {v ∈ Val | v(ϕ)= true}
⇒
{
v ∈ Val | v
(
θ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
= true
}
⊆
{
v ∈ Val | v
(
ϕ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
= true
}
{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v
(
θ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
= true
}
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⊆
{
τ (v) | v ∈ Val, v
(
ϕ ∧
∨
α
)
= true
}
since τ is a bijectionS∈FΓ
S
⇒ λ
(
θ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
⊆ λ
(
ϕ ∧
∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
by Lemma 6
⇒ λ(θ)∩ λ
( ∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
⊆ λ(ϕ)∩ λ
( ∨
S∈FΓ
αS
)
by Definition 3
⇒ λ(θ)∩FΓ ⊆ λ(ϕ)∩FΓ by Lemma 20
⇒ θ |=Γ ϕ as required. ✷
Proposition 21 tells us that the information regarding the meaning of labels in LA
contained in a particular focal set S can be completely represented by the logical expression
αS . In some sense this is to be expected since for any set S, αS provides a logical description
of S by stating exactly what labels are and are not contained in S. The next corollary
follows trivially from Proposition 21.
Corollary 22. θ ≡Γ ϕ iff∨
S∈FΓ
αS ∧ θ ≡
∨
S∈FΓ
αS ∧ ϕ.
We should observe that since mΓx can be completely determined by µΓL1(x), . . . ,µ
Γ
Ln
(x)
then the set of focal elements for Γ can also be determined given only these values.
Therefore, in a strong sense the full meaning of the labels in LA are captured by their
appropriateness degrees. A common example of (i) in Definition 18 is when a certain
label is conceptually implied by another label. For instance, we might say that whenever
someone is described as being very tall then they can also be described as tall. In fuzzy
set theory this would be captured by taking the fuzzy set for very tall as a fuzzy subset
of the fuzzy set for tall. In label semantics we would expect to have a frame Γ in
which whenever very tall was deemed an appropriate label so was tall. In other words
very tall |=Γ tall or alternatively |=Γ very tall → tall. In such a case it is easy to see that
∀x ∈Ω µΓvery tall(x) µΓtall(x) so that in this instance fuzzy set theory and label semantics
would coincide. In general, we have that for any frame Γ such that θ |=Γ ϕ then ∀x ∈Ω
µΓθ (x)µΓϕ (x).
Example 23. Let LA = {small,medium, large}, Ω = [0,10] and Γ be a frame such that
µΓsmall, µ
Γ
medium and µ
Γ
large are trapezoidal functions (see Fig. 2) defined by
µΓsmall(x)=
{1 if x ∈ [0,2],
2− x2 if x ∈ (2,4],
0 if x > 4,
µΓmedium(x)=


0 if x < 2,
x
2 − 1 if x ∈ (2,4],
1 if x ∈ (4,6],
4− x2 if x ∈ (6,8],
0 if x > 8,
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µΓlarge(x)=
{0 if x < 6,
x
2 − 3 if x ∈ [6,8],
1 if x > 8.
Allowing x to vary across [0,10] we obtain the following definition of mΓx as follows:
(see Fig. 3):
mΓx
({small})=
{1 if x ∈ [0,2],
3− x if x ∈ (2,3],
0 if x > 3,
mΓx
({small,medium})=


0 if x < 2,
x
2 − 1 if x ∈ [2,3],
2− x2 if x ∈ (3,4],
0 if x > 4,
mΓx
({medium})=


0 if x < 3,
x − 3 if x ∈ [3,4],
1 if x ∈ (4,6],
7− x if x ∈ (6,7],
0 if x > 7,
mΓx
({medium, large})=


0 if x < 6,
x
2 − 3 if x ∈ [6,7],
4− x2 if x ∈ (7,8],
0 if x > 8,
J. Lawry / Artificial Intelligence 155 (2004) 1–39 19Fig. 3. Mass assignments for varying x; shown from left to right, mΓx ({small}), mΓx ({small,medium}),
mΓx ({medium}), mΓx ({medium, large}) and mΓx ({large}); mΓx (∅) is equal to mΓx ({small,medium}) for x ∈ [2,4],
is equal to mΓx ({medium, large}) for x ∈ [6,8] and is zero otherwise.
mΓx
({large})=
{0 if x < 7,
x − 7 if x ∈ [7,8],
1 if x > 8,
mΓx (∅)=


0 if x < 2,
x
2 − 1 if x ∈ [2,3],
2− x2 if x ∈ (3,4],
0 if x ∈ (4,6],
x
2 − 3 if x ∈ (6,7],
4− x2 if x ∈ (7,8],
0 if x > 8.
This gives a set of focal elements FΓ = {∅, {small}, {small,medium}, {medium},
{medium, large}, {large}} from which, for example, it follows that:
µΓmedium∧¬large(x)
=mΓx
({small,medium})+mΓx ({medium})=


0 if x < 2,
x
2 − 1 if x ∈ [2,4],
1 if x ∈ (4,6],
7− x if x ∈ (6,7],
0 if x > 7,
µΓ¬small∧medium∧¬large(x)=mΓx
({medium})=


0 if x < 3,
x − 3 if x ∈ [3,4],
1 if a ∈ (4,6],
7− x if x ∈ (6,7],
0 if x > 7,
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medium∧¬large(x) (solid line) and min(µΓmedium(x),1−µΓlarge(x))=µΓmedium(x)
(dashed line).
µΓ¬(small∨medium)(x)=mΓx
({large})+mΓx (∅)=


0 if x < 2,
x
2 − 1 if x ∈ [2,3],
2− x2 if x ∈ (3,4],
0 if x ∈ (4,6],
x
2 − 3 if x ∈ (6,8],
1 if x > 8.
Fig. 3 shows the values of the mass assignment mx for each focal element as x ranges
across Ω . From this we see that mass is associated with the empty set for values in the
ranges [2,4] and [6,8]. In label semantics this suggest that there are individuals in V for
whom none of the terms in LA are appropriate as labels for values in these ranges. One
might observe that this phenomena occurs frequently in natural language especially when
labelling perceptions generated along some continuum. For example, we occasionally en-
counter colours for which none of our available colour descriptors seem appropriate. Fig. 4
clearly illustrates the difference between label semantics and fuzzy logic when evaluating
compound expressions such as, in this case, medium∧¬large. It is interesting to note that
using strongly functional fuzzy logic based on min as the conjunction function, the two
statements x is medium and x is medium but not large provide exactly the same informa-
tion (i.e., they have the same memberships). In other words, the extra information that x is
not large tells us nothing. This seems highly counter intuitive. On the other hand, in label
semantics µmedium∧¬large is zero for all values greater than seven since for such values the
only sets of appropriate labels with non-zero mass containing medium also contain large.
4. Multi-dimensional label semantics
Most modelling problems involve multiple attributes or variables. Therefore, if label
semantics is to provide an effective knowledge representation framework for linguistic
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modelling it must be generalised to the multi-dimensional case. In other words, we need to
provide a means of interpreting and evaluating linguistic expressions involving more than
one variable.
Specifically, consider a modelling problem with k variables (or attributes) x1, . . . , xk
with associated universes Ω1, . . . ,Ωk . For each variable we define a set of labels LAj =
{L1,j , . . . ,Lnj ,j } for j = 1, . . . , k. In this case we ask individuals from V to provide a
set of appropriate labels for each attribute value. Hence, an individual I will provide a
vector of label descriptions 〈DIa1, . . . ,DIak 〉 for the attribute vector 〈a1, . . . , ak〉. In this
context we can extend the definitions of mass assignment and appropriateness degree
given in Section 3 to the multi-dimensional case. Initially, however, we formally define
k-dimensional linguistic expressions.
Let LEj be the set of label expression for variable xj generated by recursive application
of the connectives ∧, ∨, →, ¬ to the labels in LAj . We can now define the set of multi-
dimensional label expression for describing linguistic relationships between variables as
follows:
Definition 24 (Multi-dimensional label expressions). MLE(k) is the set of all multi-
dimensional label expressions that can be generated from the label expression LEj : j =
1, . . . , k and is defined recursively by:
(i) If θ ∈ LEj for j = 1, . . . , k then θ ∈ MLE(k).
(ii) If θ,ϕ ∈MLE(k) then ¬θ , θ ∧ ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ, θ → ϕ ∈ MLE(k).
Any k-dimensional label expression θ identifies a subset of 2LA1 × · · · × 2LAk , denoted
λ(k)(θ), constraining the cross product of label descriptions Dx1 × · · · × Dxk . In this
way the imprecise constraint θ on x1 × · · · × xk is interpreted as the precise constraint
Dx1 × · · · ×Dxk ∈ λ(k)(θ).
Definition 25 (Multi-dimensional appropriate label sets). ∀θ ∈ MLE(k) λ(k)(θ)⊆ 2LA1 ×
· · · × 2LAk such that
• ∀θ ∈ LEj λ(k)(θ)= 1λ(θ)××i "=j2LAi .
• ∀θ,ϕ ∈MLE(k) λ(k)(θ ∧ ϕ)= λ(k)(θ)∩ λ(k)(ϕ).
• λ(k)(θ ∨ ϕ)= λ(k)(θ)∪ λ(k)(ϕ).
• λ(k)(θ → ϕ)= λ(k)(θ)∪ λ(k)(ϕ).
• λ(k)(¬θ)= λ(k)(θ).
Note that in the context of a particular frame Γ it may be more convenient to evaluate
λ(k)(θ)∩× kj=1F (j)Γ where F (j)Γ is the set of focal elements for LAj given frame Γ (see
Definition 17).
1 λ(θ)⊆ LAj refers to the one dimensional appropriate label set as given in Definition 3.
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Example 26. Consider a modelling problem with two variables x1 and x2 for which
LA1 = {small,medium, large} and LA2 = {low,moderate,high}. Also suppose that for a
given frame Γ the focal elements for LA1 and LA2 are, respectively:
F (1)Γ =
{{small}, {small,medium}, {medium}, {medium, large}, {large}},
F (2)Γ =
{{low}, {low,moderate}, {moderate}, {moderate,high}, {high}}.
Now according to Definition 25 we have that:
λ(2)
(
(medium∧¬small)∧¬low)= λ(2)(medium∧¬small)∩ λ(2)(¬low)
= λ(medium∧¬small)× λ(¬low).
Now
λ(medium∧¬small)∩F (1)Γ =
{{medium}, {medium, large}}
and
λ(¬low) ∩F (2)Γ =
{{moderate}, {moderate,high}, {high}}.
Hence,
λ(2)
(
(medium∧¬small)∧¬low)∩ (F (1)Γ ×F (2)Γ )
= {〈{medium}, {moderate}〉,
〈{medium}, {moderate,high}〉,
〈{medium}, {high}〉,
〈{medium, large}, {moderate}〉,
〈{medium, large}, {moderate,high}〉,
〈{medium, large}, {high}〉}.
Definition 27 (Joint mass assignment).
∀xj ∈Ωj ∀Sj ⊆ LAj : j = 1, . . . , k m〈x1,...,xk〉(S1, . . . , Sk)=
k∏
j=1
mxj (Sj ).
Now
m〈x1,...,xk〉(S1, . . . , Sk)= PV
({I ∈ V : Dx1 = S1, . . . ,Dxk = Sk})
provided we make the following conditional independence assumption. It is assumed that
for each individual I the choice of appropriate labels for variable xj is dependent only on
the value of xj , once this is known, and is independent of the value of any other variables.
This is actually quite a weak assumption and does not a prior imply independence between
the variables.
J. Lawry / Artificial Intelligence 155 (2004) 1–39 23
Definition 28 (Multi-dimensional appropriateness degrees).
∀θ ∈ MLE(k), ∀xj ∈Ωj : j = 1, . . . , k
µ
(k)
θ (x1, . . . , xk)=
∑
〈S1,...,Sk〉∈λ(k)(θ)
m〈x1,...,xk〉(S1, . . . , Sk)
=
∑
〈S1,...,Sk〉∈λ(k)(θ)
k∏
j=1
mxj (Sj ).
Proposition 29. If θ ∈MLE(c) for c < k then
∀xj ∈Ωj : j = 1, . . . , k µ(k)θ (x1, . . . , xk)= µ(c)θ (x1, . . . , xc).
Proof. By Definition 25 λ(k)(θ)= λ(c)(θ)×× kj=c+12LAj and therefore,
µ
(k)
θ (x1, . . . , xk)=
∑
〈S1,...,Sc〉∈λ(c)(θ)
∑
〈Sc+1,...,Sk〉∈2LAc+1×···×2LAk
m∏
j=1
mxj (Sj )
=
∑
〈S1,...,Sc〉∈λ(c)(θ)
c∏
j=1
mxj (Sj )
∑
Sc+1⊆LAc+1
. . .
∑
Sk⊆LAk
k∏
j=c+1
mxj (Sj )
=
∑
〈S1,...,Sc〉∈λ(c)(θ)
c∏
j=1
mxj (Sj )
[
k∏
j=c+1
∑
Sj⊆LAj
mxj (Sj )
]
=
∑
〈S1,...,Sc〉∈λ(c)(θ)
c∏
j=1
mxj (Sj )= µ(c)θ (x1, . . . , xc)
as required. ✷
Proposition 30. Let θj ∈ LEj : j = 1, . . . , k, then the appropriateness degree of the
conditional (
∧k−1
j=1 θj )→ θk is given by
µ
(k)
(
∧k−1
j=1 θj )→θk
(x1, . . . , xk)= 1−
k−1∏
j=1
µθj (xj )+
k∏
j=1
µθj (xj ).
Proof. By Definition 25 we have that
λ(k)
((
k−1∧
j=1
θj
)
→ θk
)
= λ(k)
(
k−1∧
j=1
θj
)
∪ λ(k)(θk)= λ(k)
(
k−1∧
j=1
θj
)
∩ λ(k)(θk).
Now again by Definition 25 it follows that
λ(k)
(
k−1∧
j=1
θj
)
∩ λ(k)(θk)= λ(θ1)× · · · × λ(θk−1)× λ(θk).
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Therefore,µ
(k)
(
∧k−1
j=1 θj )→θk
(x1, . . . , xk)
= 1−
[
k−1∏
j=1
∑
Sj∈λ(θj )
mxj (Sj )
]
×
[ ∑
Sk∈λ(θk)
mxk (Sk)
]
= 1−
[
k−1∏
j=1
µθj (xj )
]
× [1−µθk (xk)]= 1−
k−1∏
j=1
µθj (xj )+
k∏
j=1
µθj (xj )
as required. ✷
It is interesting to note that this corresponds to the use of a Reichenbach implication
operator which, not surprisingly, is generated from the product t-conorm.
Example 31. Consider a modelling problem with two variables x1, x2 each with universe
[0,10] and for which we have defined the label sets LA1 = {small1(s1),medium1(m1),
large1(l1)} and LA2 = {small2(s2),medium2(m2), large2(l2)}. For both variables the
appropriateness degrees for small,medium and large are defined as in Example 23. Now
suppose we learn that:
If x1 is medium but not large then x2 is medium
then according to Proposition 30 the appropriateness degree for medium1 ∧ ¬large1 →
medium2 is given by
µ
(2)
medium1∧¬large1→medium2(x1, x2)
= 1−µmedium1∧¬large1(x1)+µmedium1∧¬large1(x1)µmedium2(x2).
Assuming the appropriateness degrees for small, medium and large given in Example 23
then the resulting function is shown in Fig. 5.
Clearly, this function provides information regarding the relationship between x1 and
x2 assuming the constraint medium1 ∧ ¬large1 → medium2. For instance, from Fig. 5 we
Fig. 5. Plot of the appropriateness degree for medium1 ∧¬large1 →medium2.
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can see that if x1 = 5 the it is very unlikely that 8 x2  10. The problem of how to make
output predictions (for x2) given input values (for x1) is considered in detail in the sequel.
Now suppose we also learn that
If x1 is large then x2 is small.
In this case we would want to evaluate the appropriateness degrees for the expression
(medium1 ∧¬large1 → medium2)∧ (large1 → small2). For this expression we have
λ(2)
(
(m1 ∧¬l1 →m2)∧ (l1 → s2)
)
= (λ(2)(m1 ∧¬l1)∪ λ(2)(m2))∩ (λ(2)(l1)∪ λ(2)(s2))
= (λ(2)(m1 ∧¬l1)∩ λ(2)(m2))∪ (λ(2)(l1)∩ λ(2)(s2))
= (λ(m1 ∧¬l1)× λ(m2))∪ (λ(l1)× λ(s2)).
Now
λ(m1 ∧¬l1)× λ(m2) ∩
(F (1)Γ ×F (2)Γ )
= {{s1,m1}, {m1}}× {{m2}, {m2, l2}, {l2}, ∅}
and
λ(l1)× λ(s2)∩
(F (1)Γ ×F (2)Γ )= {{l1}, {m1, l1}}× {{m2}, {m2, l2}, {l2}, ∅}.
Hence, since these two sets on 2LA1 × 2LA2 are mutually exclusive it follows that:
∀x1 ∈Ω1, ∀x2 ∈Ω2 µ(2)(m1∧¬l1→m2)∧(l1→s2)(x1, x2)
= 1−
( ∑
S1∈λ(m1∧¬l1)
∑
S2∈λ(m2)
mx1(S1)mx2(S2)+
∑
S1∈λ(l1)
∑
S2∈λ(s2)
mx1(S1)mx2(S2)
)
= 1− (µm1∧¬l1(x1)× (1−µm2(x2))+µl1(x1)× (1−µs2(x2))).
Again assuming the appropriateness degrees for small, medium and large given in
Example 23 then the resulting function is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Plot of the appropriateness degree for (medium1 ∧¬large1 →medium2)∧ (large1 → small2).
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The semantics proposed in this section are based on the idea that the meaning of vague
linguistic expressions are determined by their use across a population of individuals. This
is very close to the theory of vagueness proposed by Black [3]. An alternative viewpoint
is that fuzzy concepts are inherently vague independent of their actual use. In principle, it
may be possible to provide an operational semantics for membership functions consistent
with this interpretation but very little foundational work of this kind has been undertaken.
For example, one possible semantics of this kind is based on the idea that membership
values are a measure of similarity to some set of prototypical exemplars of the concept
(see [31,33]). However, such an alternative approach to the problem of vague concepts
is not within the scope of this paper where instead we focus entirely on the random set
interpretation.
5. Conditional information from linguistic constraints
To understand what is the information content of linguistic expressions we must also
consider the nature of the constraints that such expression place on the underlying variable.
If it is know that Bill is tall exactly what does this tell us about Bill’s height? For example,
can we determine an exact value, a distribution of values or a family of distributions? In
[37] it is proposed that such constraints specify a possibility distribution on the underlying
variable, namely that given by the membership degree of the associated fuzzy set. This in
itself would suggest a resulting family of probability distributions as characterised by the
corresponding possibility and dual necessity measure. However, in many applications of
fuzzy sets, in particular fuzzy control, so-called defuzzification techniques seem to treat
the possibility distribution as if it were a probability distribution in order to estimate a
precise value for the variable. In the case of Bill’s height the so called centre of mass
defuzzification method (see [30]) would evaluate∫
Ω xµtall(x)dx∫
Ω µtall(x)dx
.
Clearly, this has no obvious semantic justification in fuzzy set theory. In addition, the
association of membership values with fuzzy sets as discussed in [37] is more in the nature
of a primitive definition rather than being a consequence of some lower level semantics for
either membership or possibility.
In this section we will introduce a label semantics based approach to linguistic
constraints for which we will argue that in order to make any inferences about the
underlying variable based on a linguistic expression we must not only have knowledge
of the frame but also of the associated extended frame. Since appropriateness degrees,
the analogue of fuzzy memberships in label semantics, are determined by the frame only
then clearly we are claiming that such information alone is inadequate to draw any but
the most general conclusions from linguistic expressions. For simplicity, we will assume
in the sequel that the extended frame Γ + is such that either PΩ is discrete or it has an
associated density function pΩ . Now consider a knowledge base consisting of a single
label expression θ with meaning Dx ∈ λ(θ). Then according to Bayes’ theorem we can
infer the following posterior distribution on Ω :
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– Continuous case.∀a ∈Ω p(a|θ)= Pr(θ | x = a)pΩ(a)∫
Ω
Pr(θ | x)pΩ(x)dx .
– Discrete case.
∀a ∈Ω Pr(x = a|θ)= Pr(θ | x = a)PΩ(x = a)∑
x∈Ω: PΩ(x)>0 Pr(θ | x)PΩ(x)
.
Now according to label semantics
Pr(θ | x = a)= Pr(Dx ∈ λ(θ) | x = a)= Pr(Da ∈ λ(θ))= ∑
S∈λ(θ)
ma(S)= µθ(a).
Therefore, we obtain in the continuous case
∀x ∈Ω p(x | θ)= µθ(x)pΩ(x)∫
Ω
µθ (x)pΩ(x)dx
and in the discrete case
∀x ∈Ω Pr(x | θ)= µθ (x)PΩ(x)∑
x∈Ω: PΩ(x)>0µθ(x)PΩ(x)
.
From the above we can see that appropriateness degrees may be viewed as a likelihood
measure (i.e., µθ(x) can be interpreted as the likelihood that θ is an appropriate label
for x). This is not surprising since as Dubois and Prade [6] comment, the likelihood
and random set semantics for fuzzy concepts are strongly linked. A number of authors
have independently investigated likelihood semantics for possibility or fuzzy sets outside
the random set framework, including Hisdal [17] and Dubois, Moral and Prade [7]. Also
Thomas [32] has investigated the relationship between Bayesian reasoning and fuzzy sets.
The above likelihood interpretation has important consequences regarding the level of
condition information we can obtain from the knowledge that x is constrained by θ . Clearly
given that appropriateness degrees are defined for LA (i.e., we have sufficient knowledge
of the frame) then our knowledge of the above posterior distribution depends entirely
on our knowledge of the prior PΩ (i.e., the associated extended frame). For example, if
we know only that PΩ ∈ P , for some set of distributions P , then we will only be able
to determine upper and lower bounds for the posterior describing an inferred family of
posterior distributions. In the discrete case these upper and lower probabilities are defined
as follows:
∀x ∈Ω Pr∗(x | θ)= sup
PΩ∈P
µθ (x)PΩ(x)∑
x∈Ω µθ(x)PΩ(x)
and
∀x ∈Ω Pr∗(x | θ)= inf
PΩ∈P
µθ (x)PΩ(x)∑
x∈Ω µθ(x)PΩ(x)
.
This essentially, corresponds to a special case of imprecise Bayesian inference as proposed
by Walley [34]. However, it should be noted that often in practice surprisingly little
information can be inferred from such knowledge. For example, consider the scenario
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described in Example 1, but where our prior knowledge is that the score on the dice is
either 2 or 3 (i.e., P = {PΩ | PΩ(2)+PΩ(3)= 1}). Furthermore, suppose that we are also
informed that the SCORE is low. Now since the appropriateness degree of low for 2 is 1
while for 3 it is only 13 one might expect that we could safely infer that
Pr(SCORE = 2 | low) Pr(SCORE = 3 | low).
A little trivial mathematics, however, reveals that this is not the case since for a prior
where PΩ(2)= 1 we find that Pr(SCORE = 2 | low) = 1 and Pr(SCORE = 3 | low) = 0,
while for a prior where PΩ(3)= 1 we obtain Pr(SCORE = 3 | low)= 1 and Pr(SCORE =
2 | low) = 0. Obviously, then in terms of upper and lower bounds we can infer only that
Pr(SCORE = 2 | low),Pr(SCORE = 3 | low) ∈ [0,1] and Pr(SCORE ∈ {1,2} | low) = 1.
We see then that even in the presence of relatively specific linguistic constraints the
information we can infer about the value of the underlying variable is strongly dependent
on our prior assumptions about its distribution. For instance, the inequality
Pr(SCORE = 2 | low) Pr(SCORE = 3 | low)
as suggested above, holds if and only if
PΩ(2)
µlow(3)
µlow(2)+µlow(3) =
1
4
.
See [35] for an alternative semantics for linguistic concepts based on upper and lower
probabilities.
A common, although sometimes problematic (see [36] for a discussion) assumption in
Bayesian analysis is to assume a uniform prior on Ω . In this case we obtain
Pr(2 | low)= µlow(2)
µlow(2)+µlow(3) =
3
4
and
Pr(3 | low)= µlow(3)
µlow(2)+µlow(3) =
1
4
.
Generally, the assumption of a uniform prior on Ω gives us Pr(x|θ) proportional to µθ(x),
that is
p(x | θ)= µθ(x)∫
Ω
µθ(x)dx
in the continuous case and
Pr(x | θ)= µθ (x)∑
x∈Ω µθ(x)
in the discrete case.
Now if it is required that we estimate a precise value of x on the basis of a linguistic
constraint θ then a natural approach in the current context would be simply to determine the
expected value of Pr(x | θ). Clearly, if a uniform prior on Ω is assumed then this gives us
an expression for appropriateness degrees equivalent to the centre of mass defuzzification
method as described above.
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We now illustrate how such conditioning can be used to evaluate output values of
a system given specific input values when the relationships between input and output
variables are described in terms of linguistic expressions. Initially, however, we observe
that the conditional distributions defined above can easily be extended to the multi-
dimensional case so that for θ ∈MLE(k):
∀xj ∈Ωj, j = 1, . . . , k,
p(x1, . . . , xk | θ)= µ
(k)
θ (x1, . . . , xk)p(x1, . . . , xk)∫
Ω1
. . .
∫
Ωk
µ
(k)
θ (x1, . . . , xk)p(x1, . . . , xk)d$x
,
where p(x1, . . . , xk) is the prior distribution on Ω1 × · · · ×Ωk .
Example 32. Recall the problem described in Example 31 where our knowledge of the
relationship between variables x1 and x2 corresponds to
K≡ (medium1 ∧¬large1 → medium2)∧ (large1 → small2).
Assuming a uniform prior distribution on [0,10]2 then the posterior distribution on x1×x2
is given by
∀x1 ∈Ω1, x2 ∈Ω2
p(x1, x2 |K)=
µ
(2)
(m1∧¬l1→m2)∧(l1→s2)(x1, x2)∫ 10
0
∫ 10
0 µ
(2)
(m1∧¬l1→m2)∧(l1→s2)(x1, x2)dx1 dx2
.
Now suppose we are given the value of x1 and we want to calculate the probability of
different values of x2 given this information. In this case we need to evaluate the following
conditional distribution:
p(x2 |K, x1)= p(x1, x2 |K)
p(x1 |K) =
µ
(2)
(m1∧¬l1→m2)∧(l1→s2)(x1, x2)∫ 10
0 µ
(2)
(m1∧¬l1→m2)∧(l1→s2)(x1, x2)dx2
.
A plot of this distribution as both x1 and x2 vary is given in Fig. 7.
In the case that x1 = 6.5 the conditional density p(x2 |K,6.5) is shown in Fig. 8.
Fig. 7. Plot of the conditional density p(x2 |K, x1).
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Therefore, in order to obtain an estimate of output x2 given input x1 = 6.5 we can
evaluate the expected value of this distribution:
xˆ1 =
10∫
0
x2p(x2 |K,6.5)dx2 = 4.5079.
In many situations our conditional information may not take the form of a linguistic
expression but rather a distribution on linguistic expressions. In label semantics such
information provides constraints on the distribution (mass assignment) for Dx as x varies.
Here we consider only the simplest case where sufficient constraints are available to
specify a unique mass assignment on Dx . To illustrate how such specific knowledge
might be obtained let us return to the height problem where we have an extended frame
Γ + = 〈V,PV ,Ω,PΩ〉 where PΩ is a prior based on a known distribution on heights of
European males. Furthermore, suppose we have a database DB of heights of a finite number
of British males so that for x ∈ Ω , PDB(x) corresponds to the probability of a male of
height x being chosen at random from DB. Given this we can evaluate a mass assignment
on Dx conditional on the information that x is the height of a British male as follows:
∀S ⊆ LA mDB(S)=
∑
x∈Ω: PDB(x)>0
PDB(x)mx(S).
Now given a posterior mass assignment mDB on Dx what information can we infer
regarding the underlying variable x? According to the theorem of total probability
p(a)=
∑
S⊆LA
Pr(Dx = S)p(a |Dx = S).
Hence, if we know that ∀S ⊆ LA Pr(Dx = S) = mDB(S) then we can condition on this
knowledge as follows:
p(a |mDB)=
∑
S⊆LA
mDB(S)p(a |Dx = S).
Now according to Bayes theorem
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∀a ∈Ω p(a |Dx = S)= Pr(Dx = S | x = a)pΩ(a)∫
Ω Pr(Dx = S | x = a)pΩ(a)da
= ma(S)pΩ(a)∫
Ω ma(S)pΩ(a)da
.
Let∫
Ω
ma(S)pΩ(a)da = pm(S)
be the prior mass assignment on Dx generated by prior distribution PΩ on Ω then we have
∀x ∈Ω p(x |mDB)=
∑
S⊆LA
mDB(S)
mx(S)pΩ(x)
pm(S)
= pΩ(x)
∑
S⊆LA
mDB(S)
pm(S)
mx(S).
Notice that in the case where ∀S ⊆ LA mDB(S) = pm(S), in other words when our
posterior knowledge of Dx matches our prior knowledge, then p(x |mDB)= pΩ(x) as one
would intuitively expect.
Example 33. This example relates to a database stored as part of the machine learning
repository at the University of California at Irvine. It is essentially a classification
problem but serves well to illustrate the use of label semantics to determine underlying
distributions from data. The database itself contains the details of 768 females from the
population of Pima Indians living near Phoenix Arizona, USA. The diagnostic binary-
valued variable investigated is whether the patient shows signs of diabetes according to
World Health Organisation criteria. There are eight measured variables which include,
number of times pregnant, plasma glucose concentration, diastolic blood pressure, triceps
skin fold thickness, 2-hour serum insulin, body mass index, diabetes pedigree function
and age. A label semantics approach has been used in [21] and [29] in conjunction with a
Bayesian classifier but here we shall simply use this example to show how a posterior
mass assignment can be used to infer a posterior density on the underlying variable,
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diastolic blood pressure. In this case LA = {very small, small,medium, large, very large}
with appropriateness degrees as shown in Fig. 9. These functions have been defined using a
percentile based approach to ensure that each label covers approximately the same number
of data elements. Clearly, the set of focal elements for this frame is given by
FΓ =
{{very small}, {small, very small}, {small}, {small,medium}, {medium},
{medium, large}, {large}, {large, very large}, {very large}}.
The extended frame is assumed to be such that Ω = [0,122] and PΩ is the uniform
distribution on this interval. The posterior mass assignments (see Fig. 10) generated from
the sub-database, DIAB, of diabetic individuals is given by
mDIAB = {very small} : 0.0805969, {very small, small} : 0.110448,
{small} : 0.101492, {small,medium} : 0.117911, {medium} : 0.07462,
{medium, large} : 0.084223, {large} : 0.106608,
{large, very large} : 0.222976, {very large} : 0.101119.
The prior mass assignment for this domain based on a uniform prior PΩ is
pm= {very small} : 0.368, {very small, small} : 0.1434, {small} : 0.04099,
{small,medium} : 0.03074, {medium} : 0.02049, {medium, large} : 0.02459,
{large} : 0.02869, {large, very large} : 0.09631, {very large} : 0.2459.
Now, for instance, if a = 68 we have that
m68 = {small} : 0.4, {small,medium} : 0.6
and therefore,
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p(68 |mDIAB)= 1122
[
mDIAB({small})
pm({small}) m68
({small})
+ mDIAB({small,medium})
pm({small,medium}) m68
({small,medium})]
= 1
122
[
0.101492
0.04099
(0.4)+ 0.11791
0.03074
(0.6)
]
= 0.0269822.
The full posterior density obtained is shown in Fig. 11.
Another interesting issue relating to conditional inference with linguistic expressions is
that of the conditional matching of expressions. For example, suppose we are told that Bill
is tall then with what level of certainty, if any, can we infer that Bill is very tall? In the next
section we propose two approaches to matching within the framework of label semantics,
both probabilistic in nature.
6. Matching linguistic expressions
Suppose it is known that the variable x is constrained by the linguistic expression ϕ.
In this case, what is the degree to which another expression, θ , can appropriately be
used to describe x . This is an important question that takes on special significance in the
area of fuzzy or possibilistic logic programming [1,2,8]. In this context a mechanism is
required by which we can evaluate the semantic match (or unification) of an expression
θ , forming part of a query, with a given expression ϕ in the knowledge base. A number
of authors have investigate this problem but of most relevance to the current framework
is work by Baldwin et al. [2] who introduces a measure of semantic unification based on
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the conditional probability of fuzzy events. This measure is also based on random sets, but
defined on the attribute universe rather than at the label level. In this section we present two
measures of matching between expressions and discuss their respective properties. The first
approach is as follows: If we know that linguistic expression ϕ holds then this corresponds
to the event Dx ∈ λ(ϕ) and, according to Bayesian inference, we should update our prior
mass assignment m to obtain a posterior mass assignment mϕ as follows:
∀S ⊆ LA mϕ(S)=
{
pm(S)∑
S∈λ(ϕ) pm(S)
if S ∈ λ(ϕ),
0 otherwise.
Interestingly mϕ can be used to show the consistency between the definition of
conditional distribution given a linguistic expression and that of conditional distribution
given a mass assignment as is highlighted by the following proposition. (NB. In the
following two proofs it is assumed PΩ has a density pΩ . The finite case can be proved
in a similar way.)
Proposition 34. ∀x ∈Ω p(x|mϕ)= p(x | ϕ).
Proof.
∀x ∈Ω p(x |mϕ)= pΩ(x)
∑
S⊆LA
mϕ(S)
pm(S)
mx(S)= pΩ(x)
∑
S∈λ(ϕ)
mϕ(S)
pm(S)
mx(S)
by the definition of mϕ
= pΩ(x)
∑
S∈λ(ϕ)
mx(S)∑
S∈λ(ϕ) pm(S)
= pΩ(x)
∑
S∈λ(ϕ) mx(S)∑
S∈λ(ϕ) pm(S)
.
Now
∑
S∈λ(ϕ) mx(S)= µϕ(x) by Definition 11 and∑
S∈λ(ϕ)
pm(S)=
∑
S∈λ(ϕ)
∫
Ω
mx(S)pΩ(x)dx =
∫
Ω
( ∑
S∈λ(ϕ)
mx(S)
)
pΩ(x)dx
=
∫
Ω
µϕ(x)pΩ(x)dx.
Therefore
p(x |mϕ)= pΩ(x)µϕ(x)∫
Ω
pΩ(x)µϕ(x)dx
= p(x | ϕ). ✷
Given mϕ we can then evaluate the likelihood of another linguistic expression θ
according to the following definition.
Definition 35 (Matching of type I).
∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE µΓ +θ |ϕ =
∑
S∈λ(θ)
mϕ(S).
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It can easily be seen that this definition of match can be expressed in terms of conditional
probabilities on Dx as follows:
Proposition 36. ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE µΓ +θ |ϕ = Pr(Dx ∈ λ(θ) |Dx ∈ λ(ϕ)).
Proof.
Pr
(Dx ∈ λ(θ) |Dx ∈ λ(ϕ))= Pr(Dx ∈ λ(θ)∩ λ(ϕ))Pr(Dx ∈ λ(ϕ)) =
Pr(Dx ∈ λ(θ ∧ ϕ))
Pr(Dx ∈ λ(ϕ))
by Definition 3 and by Bayes’ theorem
=
∫
Ω Pr(Dx ∈ λ(θ ∧ ϕ) | x = a)pΩ(a)da∫
Ω Pr(Dx ∈ λ(ϕ) | x = a)pΩ(a)da
=
∫
Ω
(
∑
S∈λ(θ∧ϕ) ma(S))pΩ(a)da∫
Ω(
∑
S∈λ(ϕ) ma(S))pΩ(a)da
=
∑
S∈λ(θ∧ϕ)
∫
Ω ma(S)pΩ(a)da∑
S∈λ(ϕ)
∫
Ω
ma(S)pΩ(a)da
=
∑
S∈λ(θ∧ϕ) pm(S)∑
S∈λ(ϕ) pm(S)
=
∑
S∈λ(θ∧ϕ)
pm(S)∑
S∈λ(ϕ) pm(S)
=
∑
S∈λ(θ)
mϕ(S). ✷
Given the above it can easily be seen that
µΓ
+
θ |ϕ =
∫
Ω µθ∧ϕ(x)pΩ(x)dx∫
Ω µϕ(x)pΩ(x)dx
.
Interestingly, when θ,ϕ ∈ LA this corresponds to the degree of subsethood measure
as proposed by Kosko [19], although for compound expressions this is not the case.
Also, this proposition shows that µΓ +θ |ϕ truly is the conditional extension of the general
appropriateness measure defined in Section 3, as the notation suggests. Furthermore, notice
that trivially µΓ +ϕ|ϕ = 1 and µΓ
+
¬ϕ|ϕ = 0 while this is not the case for many definitions of
conditional match proposed in the literature (for example, [2]). However, in label semantics
there is an alternative definition for match that does not satisfy these properties, defined as
follows. Suppose we know that ϕ has been asserted by some individual in V then what is
the likelihood that θ will hold true for some other individual randomly chosen from V . To
evaluate this we observe that given ϕ we can determine a distribution on the underlying
variable x , p(x | ϕ), and also that for any value of x we know the probability that θ
will be deemed an appropriate label expression, µθ(x). From this we obtain the following
definition for the match of θ given ϕ.
Definition 37 (Matching of type II).
∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE πΓ +θ |ϕ =
∫
Ω
µθ (x)p(x | ϕ)dx.
Given the definition of p(x|ϕ) this can be rewritten as
πΓ
+
θ |ϕ =
∫
Ω µθ(x)µϕ(x)pΩ(x)dx∫
Ω µϕ(x)pΩ(x)da
.
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πΓ
+
large|medium assuming a uniform prior and the sum of the dark and light grey areas corresponds to the numerator
of µΓ+large|medium .
Interestingly, taking µ to be analogous to fuzzy memberships then this corresponds to
the definition of conditional probability of fuzzy events proposed in [37]. Obviously, in
this case πΓ +ϕ|ϕ is not necessarily equal to 1 (or indeed πΓ
+
¬ϕ|ϕ to 0). However, this is quite
intuitive given the prevailing interpretation for π since the fact that a particular individual
deems ϕ to be an appropriate label expression does not guarantee that all individuals will.
Example 38. Consider an extended frame for which Ω = [0,1], PΩ is the uniform
distribution on [0,1] and
µmedium =


x−0.25
0.25 x ∈ [0.25,0.5),
0.75−x
0.25 x ∈ [0.5,0.75],
0 otherwise,
µlarge =


x−0.5
0.25 x ∈ [0.5,0.75),
1−x
0.25 x ∈ [0.75,1],
0 otherwise,
then we have that
µΓ
+
large|medium =
∫ 1
0 µlarge∧medium(x)dx∫ 1
0 µmedium(x)dx
=
∫ 1
0 min(µmedium(x),µlarge(x))dx∫ 1
0 µmedium(x)dx
= 0.0625
0.25
= 0.25.
Alternatively,
πΓ
+
large|medium =
∫ 1
0 µlarge(x)µmedium(x)dx∫ 1
0 µmedium(x)dx
=
∫ 0.75
0.5 (
0.75−x
0.25 )(
x−0.5
0.25 )dx
0.25
= 0.0416667
0.25
= 0.166667.
J. Lawry / Artificial Intelligence 155 (2004) 1–39 37Fig. 13. Matching of type II for medium given medium: The dark grey area represents the numerator in
πΓ
+
medium|medium.
Now as stated above µΓ +medium|medium = 1 but on the other hand
πΓ
+
medium|medium =
∫ 1
0 µ
2
medium(x)dx∫ 1
0 µmedium(x)dx
=
∫ 0.5
0.25(
x−0.25
0.25 )
2 dx
0.25
= 0.166667
0.25
= 0.666667.
7. Conclusions
A new framework for linguistic modelling, referred to as label semantics, has been
presented, based on a random set interpretation of the measure of appropriateness of a
label for a value. A natural, weakly functional calculus for appropriateness degree, has been
described, which satisfies the law of the excluded middle and in general takes account of the
logical structure of compound expressions when evaluating them. This calculus can then be
combined with a bayesian framework to provide a means of inferring distributions on the
underlying variable given both linguistic expressions and mass assignments. Furthermore,
given a linguistic expression we have also presented methods for evaluating the likely
applicability of other linguistic expressions based on the measures of conditional match
types I and II.
Overall we would claim that label semantics has the potential to act as an effective
high level knowledge representation framework for many modelling problems. At present
applications have centred on its use in data mining and machine learning where a number
of new methods have been developed based on the ideas proposed in Section 4 (see Lawry
[21] and Randon [29]). In this context label semantics offers the prospect of combining
both numerical and linguistic reasoning as discussed in Lawry [23]. Furthermore, it
provides a mechanism for conditioning on prior or background linguistic information
to infer probability distributions which can then be used in conjunction with models
derived from data. In a different context, the method for estimating distributions from data
described in Section 4 has also been used to evaluate imprecise probabilities of failure
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for risk analysis in environmental engineering (see [15] and [16]). More generally, the
framework outlined in this paper gives us a coherent calculus for linguistic reasoning
that may be used in a variety of decision-support problems. Certainly, in this context, the
notions of appropriateness degree and conditional match will have a central role to play.
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